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Abstract
By considering lifetime uncertainty, this paper
employs an OLG model within general equilibrium
framework to analyze China’s urban public pension
system. Using the condition for the steady-state of
market economy to satisfy the social welfare
maximization, we solve the optimal social pool benefit
replacement rate. This optimal replacement rate
depends on the population growth rate, survival
probability in retirement period, capital share of
income, individual discount rate and social discount
rate. The simulations show that the optimal social pool
benefit replacement rate rises with the life expectancy,
whereas falls with the population growth rate. It
should decrease when the life expectancy has risen and
the population growth rate fallen because it is much
more sensitive to the latter than the former.
1. Introduction
China reformed its urban public pension system in
the beginning of 2006. The target replacement rate of
pension benefits is adjusted. The social pool benefit
replacement rate is raised from 20% to 35%, and the
individual account benefit replacement rate is reduced
from 38.5% to 24.2%. What should be the optimal
level of replacement rate, what are the determinant
elements, and how should the optimal replacement rate
be calculated?
There are two phenomena tightly related with public
pension in China: The population growth rate has fallen,
and the life expectancy has risen. Pecchenino and
Pollard[1], Pecchenino and Utendorf[2], Pecchenino and
Pollard[3], Zhang et al.[4], etc. have used overlapping
generations (OLG) model with lifetime uncertainty to
study pay-as-you-go or fully funded public pension
systems.
Based on the literature, this paper investigates the
partially funded public pension system in China, and
explores the optimal benefit replacement rates.
2. The model
A closed economy is composed of numerous
individuals and firms and a government. The
generation born at the beginning of period t is called
generation t. The population grows at the rate of
n=(Nt/Nt-1)-1, where Nt is the population of generation t.
2.1. Individuals
Each individual survives to the end of her working
period certainly. Her survival probability in the
retirement period is [ ]1,0∈p . In the working period,
each individual earns wage by supplying inelastically
one unit of labor and makes pension contributions. She
consumes part of her incomes and saves the rest. If she
survives in her retirement period, then she consumes
her savings with accrued interest, individual account
benefits and social pool benefits. If she dies at the
beginning of her retirement period, then her savings
with accrued interest and funded pension benefits are
inherited equally by her children as unintentional
bequests.
Each individual derives utility from her working-
period consumption tc1 and possible retirement-period
consumption 12 +tc . The utility is described by an
additively separable logarithmic function. Thus, each
individual solves the following maximization problem:
{ } 121,, lnlnmax 121 ++=+ tttscc cpcUttt θ (1)
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where ( )1,0∈θ denotes the individual discount rate,
wt the wage, τ the individual contribution rate, st the
savings, rt+1 the interest rate, Bt+1 the individual account
benefits, Pt+1 the social pool benefits and bt+1 the
unintentional bequests inherited by each child.
The first-order condition for the utility
maximization problem is
( ) 01 1112 =++− ++ ttt crpc θ (5)
This familiar expression implies that the utility loss
from reducing one unit of working-period consumption
is equal to the utility gain from increasing (1+rt+1) units
of possible retirement-period consumption discounted
by .
2.2. Firms
Firms produce homogenous commodity in
competitive markets. The production is described by
Cobb-Douglas function αα −= 1ttt NAKY or
α
tt Aky = , where Yt is the output in period t, Kt the
capital stock, ( )1,0∈α the capital share of income, A
the productivity, kt=Kt/Nt the capital-labor ratio, and yt
the output-labor ratio.
Firms make pension contributions at the rate of
( )1,0∈η on their payroll. According to the product
distribution, one can get
( ) tttttt NwKrNAK ηαα ++=− 11 . The first-order
conditions for the profit maximization are
1−
=
αα tt Akr (6)
( ) ( )ηα α +−= 11 tt Akw (7)
2.3. The government
The social pool fund is paid to the retirees in the
current period as pay-as-you-go pension benefits:
tttt NwPpN η=−1 . Using the concept of social pool
benefit replacement rate  gives
( ) pwnwP ttt ηξ +== 1 (8)
thus
( )np += 1ξη (9)
The accumulation in the individual account is used to
pay the individual when she retires in the next period as
funded pension benefits. Using the concept of
individual account benefit replacement rate  gives
( ) tttt wrwB τµ 111 1 +++ +== (10)
thus
( )[ ] ( )ttt wwr 111 ++ ⋅+= µτ (11)
2.4. Dynamic Equilibrium System
The savings and the individual pension
contributions in period t generate the capital stock in
period t+1 (See Blanchard and Fischer[5] or Barro and
Sala-I-Martin[6] for details):
( ) 11 ++=+ ttt knws τ (12)
Combining equations (2)-(12) gives a dynamic
equilibrium system described by the following
difference equation:
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The social pool benefit replacement rate has effect
on the capital-labor ratio because it appears in the
dynamic system. However, the individual account
benefit replacement rate has no effect on the capital-
labor ratio because the mandatory savings (individual
pension contributions) crowds out the voluntary
savings by one-for-one.
3. Social optimum
The social welfare is the sum of the lifetime utilities
of all current and future generations (Blanchard and
Fischer[5] and Groezen et al.[7] also use an analogous
social welfare function):
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where ( )10,∈ρ is the social discount rate, which
reflects the preference of the social planner. The
resource constraint is
( ) ( )ncpcknAkk iiiii ++++=+ + 11 211α (15)
The initial condition is that k0 is given.
The social planner maximizes the social welfare
subject to the resource constraint and initial condition.
The first-order conditions for this maximization
problem are:
∗∗
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where the superscript * denotes the optimal steady state
values of variables. The capital-labor ratio satisfying
equation (17) is at the modified golden rule level,
which means that the social welfare achieves the
maximum.
In order to maximize the social welfare of the
market economy in the steady state, we control the
policy variable to adjust the capital-labor ratio of the
market economy in steady state to the modified golden
rule level, namely, ∗= kk . Substituting equation (17)
into equation (13) and arranging gives
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4. Optimal social pool benefit replacement
rate
Differentiating ∗ with respective to p and n gives
that the signs of the derivatives are not determinate.
This implies that the effects of the life expectancy and
population growth rate on the optimal social pool
benefit replacement rate are ambiguous, which can be
checked by simulating.
4.1. Estimation of parameter values
The capital share of income, , is usually to be
estimated as 0.3 in developed countries (e.g.,
Pecchenino and Pollard[3] and Zhang et al.[4]). The
labor in China is comparatively cheaper, and thus the
labor share of income is lower, while the capital share
of income is higher than that in developed countries.
Hence, we assume that  in China could be 0.35.
Suppose that a period is 26 years length. There are
two reasons for this: One is that the length is usually in
the interval of 25-30 years in the literature on OLG
model. The other is the structure of the data in China.
Assume that the individual discount rate per year is
0.98, which is similar to that used by Pecchenino and
Utendorf[2]. Hence, the individual discount rate per
period is θ = 0.9826.
There are several calibers for population statistics in
China. Since the public pension system in urban area is
different from that in rural area, and only the former is
studied in this paper, so the caliber of “Urban
Population” is selected. The population growth rate
during the period 1978-2004 is computed at n2.148
according to the “Population and Its Composition” in
China Statistical Yearbook.
The survival probability in retirement period is
estimated by the life expectancy. According to UN
Secretariat[8], the life expectancy of Chinese people in
2000-2005 is 72.0 years old. Since one period length is
26 years, the life-span from birth to the end of working-
period is 52 years. The life-span from birth to the end
of retirement period is 78 years. According to the
concept of life expectancy, one can get (1-
p)×52+p×78=72.0, which gives p76.92%. Although
the choice of period length is arbitrary, it has to obey
the following rule: Three times of the period length
should be longer than or equal to the life expectancy to
ensure p 1.
The social discount rate indicates how much the
government weights different generations in its social
welfare calculations. It should be estimated according
to the government’s regulations. The target
replacement rate of social pool benefits is 35%, which
is the optimal social pool benefit replacement rate
thought by the government. Substituting the above
related parameter values into equation (18) and
calculating repeatedly until the equation holds, we get
0.4739. These estimated values are baseline values.
4.2. Risen life expectancy
Risen life expectancy means that the survival
probability in retirement period increases. According to
the prediction of UN Secretariat[8], the life expectancy
of Chinese people in 2005-2010 is 73.0 years old, and
that in 2010-2015 is 74.0 years old. Hence, the survival
probabilities in retirement period are computed to be
80.77% and 84.62%, respectively. When the survival
probability is 80.77%, substituting the baseline values
of the other parameters into equation (18) gives

∗
=36.86%. Analogous simulation gives that ∗ is
38.08% when the survival probability is 84.62%.
Shown as Table 1, the optimal social pool benefit
replacement rate rises with the life expectancy.
Table 1. ∗ under different life expectancies 
p  76.92%  80.77%  84.62% 

∗
 
35.00%  36.86%  38.08% 
 
4.3. Fallen population growth rate 
 
We predict  the urban population  in each year  from 
2007 to 2015 with  the sample of  the urban population 
in  each  year  from  1978  to  2006.  Using  the  TREND 
function in Excel gives the result shown in Appendix A. 
The R2 value is 0.9725, which implies a very good fit. 
Computing  the population growth  rates yields  that  the 
rate during period 1984-2010 is 1.500, and that during 
period  1989-2015  is  1.272.  Simulating  with  the 
baseline  values  and  the  estimated  population  growth 
rates  gives  the  result  shown  in  Table  2.  The  optimal 
social  pool  benefit  replacement  rate  falls  with  the 
population growth rate. 
Table 2. ∗ under different population growth rates 
n  2.148  1.500  1.272 

∗
 
35.00%  21.53%  16.67% 
 
4.4. Risen life expectancy and fallen population 
growth rate 
 
,  and  are at baseline values. When the survival 
probability  in  retirement  period  is  80.77% 
(corresponding  to  2005-2010),  simulating  with  the 
population growth rates, 1.500 and 1.272, respectively, 
gives the optimal social pool benefit replacement rates, 
22.93% and 17.90%. When the survival probability  in 
retirement  period  is  84.62%  (corresponding  to  2010-
2015), simulating analogously gives the result shown in 
Table  3.  The  optimal  social  pool  benefit  replacement 
rate  falls  when  the  life  expectancy  has  risen  and  the 
population growth rate has fallen. 
Table 3. ∗ under different life expectancies and 
population growth rates 
p  n  ∗ 
80.77%  1.500  22.93% 
80.77%  1.272  17.90% 
84.62%  1.500  23.82% 
84.62%  1.272  18.68% 
Computing the elasticity of ∗ with respect  to p and 
n gives the result shown in Table 4. The elasticity of ∗ 
with  respect  to  n  is  much  higher  than  that  of  ∗  with 
respect  to p. This  implies  that  the optimal  social  pool 
benefit  replacement rate  is much more sensitive  to  the 
population growth rate than life expectancy. 
Table 4. Elasticities of ∗ with respect to p and n 

∗ to p  ∗ to n 
0.815  1.442 
0.913  1.419 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Taking  lifetime uncertainty  into account,  this paper 
employs  the  OLG  model  with  general  equilibrium  to 
analyze the urban public pension in China. It finds  the 
optimal  social  pool  benefit  replacement  rate  by 
comparing the market economy in steady state with the 
social  optimum.  The  optimal  social  pool  benefit 
replacement rate  is shown to depend on  the  individual 
discount rate, survival probability in retirement period, 
capital  share  of  income,  population  growth  rate  and 
social  discount  rate.  Simulations  show  the  following 
results:  The  optimal  social  pool  benefit  replacement 
rate rises with the  life expectancy, while falls with  the 
population  growth  rate.  It  should  fall  when  the  life 
expectancy  has  risen  and  the  population  growth  rate 
fallen  because  it  is  much  more  sensitive  to  the 
population growth rate than life expectancy. 
 
Appendix A 
 
Predicted urban population in each year 
from 2007 to 2015           (10000 persons) 
Year  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
Population  55794  57208  58621  60035  61448 
Year  2012  2013  2014  2015   
Population  62862  64276  65689  67103   
 
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